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There is one aspect of globalization over which its advocates and critics agree:
the increasingly important role of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the global
economy. The latter group criticizes the expanding market and political power
of MNEs while the former is convinced of their contribution to growth and de-
velopment. The organizational structure of MNEs can be a signi￿cant factor in
determining whether they simply exploit their market power or truly contribute
to the development of the host country. Foreign investment by MNEs can take
several forms: one option is to directly set up a wholly owned subsidiary in
order to have more control over and closer monitoring of its operations abroad;
another is to enter an agreement such as licensing, acquisition, or a joint ven-
ture (JV) with an already existing foreign ￿rm to serve a foreign market. The
question comes to mind as to which form of investment MNEs prefer under
di⁄erent circumstances and whether their preferred market structure can be an
equilibrium outcome.1
Firm-speci￿c assets may be knowledge based and can be protected by a
patent. The patent grants the MNE technological superiority, which creates
1Dunning (1981) studied di⁄erent modes of entry by considering three advantages of in-
vesting into a foreign market. This is usually referred to as the OLI framework, which stands
for ownership, locational and internalization advantage. The ownership advantage occurs as
information (technology) can be transferred over border at low cost and can therefore be
used in several facilities at no extra costs. Locational advantage comes from motives such as
tari⁄s, transport costs, market size, lower wages and closeness to customers. Internalization
advantage involves keeping crucial technology in-house by choosing FDI over licensing or JVs.
2incentives for it to move to a foreign market. When an enforcement mechanism
to protect patents is absent in the target country, the ￿rm￿ s desire to protect
its knowledge based assets can in￿ uence how (if at all) it chooses to enter that
foreign market. The IPR regime in the host country is hence likely to have an
e⁄ect on this decision. If knowledge is valuable but can be copied, a MNE may
not wish to reveal its technology to an unrelated Southern ￿rm as it would lose
absolute control over its know-how. This leads ￿rms to seek a safer alternative
and engage in green￿eld foreign direct investment (FDI) in countries with weaker
IPRs and contract enforcement mechanisms (Maskus, 1998). Subsequently, as
IPR protection in a nation becomes stronger, i.e. Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) is enforced, ￿rms would not need to rely as much
on the direct form of FDI and tend to choose more licensing and JV agreements.
The relative R&D intensity of an industry also plays an important role in the
decision of ￿rms on how to enter a foreign market. For instance in low tech goods
such as textile and apparel, distribution, hotel, etc. FDI depends relatively
little on IPRs and more on input costs and market opportunities. Investments
with technologies that are too costly to imitate likewise pay little attention to
local IPR levels.2 It is particularly in industries with valuable, but easily copied
technologies such as the pharmaceutical, chemical or the software industry where
concern over the ability of local IPRs to deter imitation arises when making
foreign investment decisions. Mans￿eld￿ s (1994) survey of intellectual property
2Note that the fact that imitation of complex technologies is getting easier with time gives
rising importance to IPRs of the host country in FDI decisions.
3executives in one hundred major US ￿rms in six industries that had international
operations found that JVs or licensing to unrelated ￿rms is seen as riskier than
FDI with a wholly owned subsidiary when IPRs are weak. This concern was
higher for more R&D intensive sectors.3 This is because the risk at stake is
much higher when technologies require higher amounts of R&D investment,
making it more e¢ cient to avoid potential losses by internalizing technology
transfer through FDI. As the IPR regime in a developing country improves, i.e.
it adopts TRIPS, we expect to see licensing and JVs displace FDI.
As technology transfer has proved to be necessary means of growth, it also
has important welfare implications for developing countries that attempt to
attract foreign capital. The illegitimate means of technology transfer can be
achieved through imitation when MNEs choose the form of entry that is rela-
tively more vulnerable to spillovers. However, it is less likely that a MNE makes
such a choice when the IPR regime in the target country is loose. The legitimate
(voluntary) form of technology transfer on the other hand can be processed
through licensing or JV agreements. This form of transfer only occurs when
￿rms see enough commitment to IPRs in the host country so that excessive
leakage of its know-how outside the JV can be prevented. It will be seen that
this form of technology transfer can be accelerated by an improvement in the
level of IPR protection in the South. Hence the South can induce the Northern
￿rm to undertake voluntary technology transfer when it sees JVs as the socially
3The concern was also higher for all sectors when a higher stage of production was under
question.
4preferable form of inward investment. In fact, the TRIPS agreement includes
provision such as the article 66.2 that requires Northern governments to provide
incentives for their ￿rms to transfer technology to the South in return for the
protection of their IPRs.4 As there has been few signs of such move by the
North, governments in the South demand that this requirement is made more
e⁄ective and have sought a mechanism for ensuring this in the Doha round.
Policies that limit direct foreign investment in the South have been used
as an indirect way to encourage inward technology transfer. Indeed, foreign
investment policies that place limits on the direct form of FDI, or on the de-
gree of foreign ownership in a JV are often observed in developing countries.
Limitations on foreign investment still persist to a great extent in non-WTO
members such as Iran. They can even be observed in several member countries
such as China, which after joining the WTO has only raised its limits on foreign
ownership of JVs in the telecommunications industry to 49% and in insurance
and automobile industries to 50% . (Lin and Saggi, 2004). This motivates an
investigation to see whether such policies are optimal for the South and if so
how they could bene￿t the latter when technology transfer is taken into account.
The role of JVs have been surprisingly little explored in the IPR literature.
Al-Saadon and Das (1996) for instance constructs a model of JVs in which
ownership shares are endogenously determined through bargaining between a
MNE and a single host ￿rm. Only another handful of papers such as Das
(1999) and Lin and Saggi (2004) dealt with di⁄erent aspects of a JV such as
4See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/techtransfer_e.htm.
5moral hazard problems and Southern policies on foreign ownership. Yet, IPR
protection as a determinant of knowledge spillover and a ￿rm￿ s decision on the
mode of entry have been absent from the discussion. Mattoo, Olarreaga and
Saggi (2004) develop a model that di⁄erentiates between FDI and acquisition
of existing domestic ￿rms. They show circumstances where the preferences of
the MNE and the host country government can be in con￿ ict, justifying policy
interventions through restrictions on FDI or JV to induce the foreign ￿rm to
choose the socially optimal mode of entry. While this paper is the closest work
to ours that deals with technology transfer and the decision of ￿rms about the
mode of entry, it also leaves out matters concerning IPRs and technological
spillovers.5
Our paper is the ￿rst theoretical paper to our knowledge that looks at IPR is-
sues surrounding JVs. First, we show that JVs are more likely to occur when the
R&D intensity of an industry is at an intermediate range. We then show in line
with empirical ￿ndings of Mans￿eld (1994) that an improved IPR regime can en-
courage JVs. We also analyze investment policies in the South and demonstrate
that they are often ine⁄ective from the perspective of the recipient country.
5Saggi (1996) also examines the choice of a MNE between FDI and licensing when there
are two ￿rms in the host country with asymmetric costs. He ￿nds that licensing is always
chosen when the licensee is legally prevented from using the acquired technology to compete
with the MNE in the rest of the world. When opportunism is allowed so that the licensee has
the option to defect, FDI can become the preferred form of entry when licensing fees cannot
recoup the damages to the MNE caused by the loss of its monopoly power in the rest of the
world.
6From the point of view of Southern welfare, strengthening the IPR regime in-
stead serves as a priority to induce a JV and with it technology transfer. It will
be seen that Southern policies on the extent of foreign ownership in a JV only
become important as a complementary policy to full IPR protection for sectors
with high R&D intensity.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the basics
of the model and looks into the FDI and JV modes of entry by the MNE. It
discusses the production and the innovation stage for each case. Section 3 solves
the bargaining game between the ￿rms in the ￿rst stage. Section 4 calculates the
equilibrium mode of entry. Section 5 studies the welfare implication for the host
country and ￿nds the socially optimal form of inward foreign investment. Policy
recommendations on inward FDI follow in this section. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Background
There are two countries: the North and the South. We assume one MNE
that belongs to the North and two local ￿rms operating in the South.6 Firms
produce a homogenous good and compete in a Cournot manner. We use an
6We use a three-￿rm framework as opposed to simply having one Northern and one South-
ern ￿rm because we need a third ￿rm in the South that stands to gain from spillovers in the
JV case. It is also fairly straightforward to extend the model to allow for more Southern ￿rms,
but this does not yield signi￿cant additional insights. The attractiveness of a JV is simply
reduced due to higher competition and a bigger loss from spillovers.
7oligopoly model as MNEs are usually found in concentrated industries. In addi-
tion, markets in which technology transfer plays an important role are usually
not perfectly competitive. For simplicity and because we wish to focus on one
industry we adopt a partial equilibrium approach.7 Firms face an aggregate
world demand of
p = A ￿ Q; (1)
where A represents the size of the integrated world market and Q is the total
quantity produced.
It is assumed that the Northern MNE has already decided to establish pro-
duction in the South with cross-border trade being infeasible or too costly.8 The
MNE must make a decision whether to enter the South through FDI or a JV
agreement. It could establish a wholly owned subsidiary to protect its technol-
ogy from exposure to Southern ￿rms. In this case the MNE remains the only
￿rm that has access to the superior technology generated by its R&D. Alterna-
tively, it could form a JV agreement with an already existing Southern ￿rm.9
In this case, a potentially loose IPR policy in the South makes it possible for
7The literature in oligopoly in general equilibrium is very small but growing. See for
instance Neary (2003) for recent work on "general oligopolistic equilibrium". In this and in
related papers Neary treats ￿rms as large in their own sectors yet small in the economy as a
whole.
8The trade-o⁄ between exporting and FDI in the context of IPRs has been explored in
previous literature (see for example Naghavi, 2005) and is not the aim of this paper.
9We rule out the possibility of the Northern ￿rm entering a JV with more than one ￿rm.
We consider that to be a less realistic case.
8local ￿rms outside the JV to imitate the Northern technology at no extra cost.
When forming a JV, the ￿rms bargain over their pro￿t share. The outcome
of the negotiations depends on the relative bargaining power and the outside
option of the ￿rms. Following Lin and Saggi (2004) we focus on the two ex-
treme negotiated outcomes: when either the Northern or Southern partner has
all the bargaining power.10 The ￿rm with full bargaining power leaves itself
the maximum rent it can achieve from a JV, while giving its partner just the
equivalent of its outside option. A JV contract only goes through if it creates
extra rents. Whether or not a JV is formed and thus the equilibrium market
structure depends both on the level of IPR protection and the R&D intensity
of the industry.
R&D investment takes place in the next stage. The level of this investment
determines the potential quality of technology transfer to the South. R&D in
this model is aimed at inventing more e¢ cient production technologies and hence
takes a cost-reducing form. The Northern MNE is assumed to be the sole ￿rm
that can invest in R&D as the South is considered less developed. The mode of
entry along with other factors such as the level of IPR protection in the South
determine the level of R&D investment. The model looks at a range of industries
with di⁄erent R&D intensities. The paper however leaves out extremely high
technology intensive industries discussed in a somewhat similar framework in
Chin and Grossman (1991) and Zigic (1998) where the Northern ￿rm may be
10Lin and Saggi (2004) actually look at three cases with the third being the share that
maximizes their joint pro￿ts. As in our models ￿rms produce to maximize joint pro￿ts, the
shares in the JV does not a⁄ect total pro￿ts.
9able to form a constrained or unconstrained monopoly.11 Such industries are
not of interest in our discussion on JVs as they are infeasible and lie beyond the
region where sharing ownership is a pro￿table option for the MNE.12 The cost
functions for the Northern and the Southern ￿rms respectively are




c = ￿ ￿ ￿
p
gx; (3)
where x ￿ ￿2=g. x is the R&D investment, g is the e⁄ectiveness of R&D, ￿ is
the pre-innovative production cost, and
￿ = b￿ (4)
is the level of technology spillovers. The parameter ￿ itself is a product of
the absorptive capacity 0 ￿ b ￿ 1 and ￿, a measure of the weakness of IPR
protection in the host country with ￿ = 0 indicating full IPR protection and
￿ = 1 the complete lack thereof.
11These models do not look at the possibility of a JV, but extend the analysis to more
technology intensive sectors where the Northern ￿rm can engage in strategic predation to deter
entry or serve the market as a unconstrained monopoly. While an unconstrained monopoly
clearly rules out the possibility of a JV, our model can be easily extended to include strategic
predation by the Northern ￿rm or the JV. This would however not bring any new insights
into the model.
12Both theory (See Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi, 2004) and empirics (Smarzynska Javorcik,
2000, Saggi and Smarzynska Javorcik 2004) prove that JVs do not occur for high technology
intensive industries. Northern ￿rms in such cases prefer to serve the foreign market through
a wholly owned subsidiary abroad even when IPRs are fully protected.
10Absorptive capacity b is the ease with which the outsider Southern ￿rm can
absorb the knowledge generated by the JV. This will depend on such factors
as the complexity of the knowledge generated an the level of development of
the Southern ￿rm and country. The larger is b, the greater is the absorptive
capacity. Thus when b = 0 it is impossible for the outsider Southern ￿rm to
learn anything from the JV while when b = 1 the ￿rm is fully capable of making
use of the available technology. When IPR protection is completely missing in
the host country, spillovers amount to the natural level determined by how easy
it is to copy the technology (￿ = b). In the rest of the paper, we focus the
discussion on changes in the level of IPR protection and take b as given. Note
that the former is a policy instrument whereas b is exogenous. Finally, ￿ = 0
always holds under FDI as it is assumed that this form of subsidiary prevents
any leakage/spillover of knowledge to competing ￿rms operating in the South.13
We also compare the welfare implications of each mode of entry to ￿nd the
socially optimal form of foreign investment for the host country. This allows us
to see whether it is optimal for the South to upgrade its IPR protection regime
and/or put restrictions on foreign ownership in a JV.
The timing of the game is as follows. Firms bargain in the ￿rst stage over
their share in a potential JV, which in turn determines the market structure. If
both ￿rms are at least as well o⁄ with the bargaining outcome than competing
on their own, the bargain is a success and the JV goes through. Otherwise
13Obviously, in practice, there can be some spillovers with FDI, although less than in a JV
situation. For simplicity we just set the spillovers under FDI equal to zero. Results remain
qualitatively the same for positive, but lower spillovers under FDI.
11the MNE enters the South through FDI. The MNE then engages in R&D and
￿rms compete in output in the ￿nal stage of the game. We now turn to the
two modes of entry and look at production and R&D investment for each case
before analyzing the bargaining game in the ￿rst stage.
2.2 FDI
When the Northern ￿rm chooses to enter the South through FDI, it simply com-
petes with active local ￿rms in the host country that produce the homogeneous
good. It is usually assumed that FDI incurs ￿xed costs that can be avoided by
forming cross-border JVs to utilize already existing facilities of a foreign ￿rm.
Fixed costs of FDI are however left out of the model for simplicity. Adding
them simply increases the attractiveness of JVs proportionally.14
A marginal cost asymmetry arises as ￿rms in the South do not have access
to the Northern ￿rm￿ s technology attained through its R&D e⁄orts. Given that
there are no spillovers with FDI (c = ￿), the pro￿ts of the Northern ￿rm and
the two Southern ￿rms are respectively
￿F = (p ￿ C)qF ￿ x (5)
and
￿Sj = (p ￿ ￿)qSj; (6)
where subscript F represents the Northern ￿rm when it engages in FDI, S
denotes a Southern ￿rm and j = 1;2 identi￿es the latter. In the ￿nal stage of
14It will be seen that although the model re￿ects a case with zero FDI ￿xed costs, a JV
results in other advantages for the MNE such as sharing the ￿xed R&D investment cost.
12the game, ￿rms compete in quantity and ￿nd their optimal output using the













for j = 1;2. As A ￿ ￿ appears in all the upcoming equations, it is replaced
by a to simplify the notation. Replacing the optimal quantities back into the
Northern ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function and di⁄erentiating the latter with respect to x,




(16 ￿ 9g)2: (9)
It can be seen that R&D e⁄ort is higher the more technology intensive is an
industry (i.e. the higher is g). Finally replacing the optimal output and R&D









(16 ￿ 9g)2 : (11)
We assume that g ￿ 4=3 to assure that all ￿rms produce non-negative output
and earn non-negative pro￿ts. A higher level of g would lead to the Southern
￿rms being driven out of the market. In that case, neither Southern ￿rm ￿nds
it pro￿table to enter the market and compete in technology intensive industries.
We rule out this case.
132.3 Joint Venture
Now assume the Northern ￿rm enters the South by forming a JV with a local
￿rm in the host country.15 We assume a JV maximizes joint pro￿ts with a ￿xed
share of pro￿ts going to each partner. The joint pro￿ts of the Northern ￿rm
and the Southern ￿rm in a JV are
￿J = (p ￿ C)qJ ￿ x (12)
with subscript J representing a JV. Note that the MNE in this case gets the
Southern partner to share its R&D costs. An agreed share of pro￿ts ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
goes to the Northern (Southern) partner where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. All production by
the JV is assumed to take place in the South. It is in the interests of both ￿rms
in a JV to have full information sharing with respect to the results of the R&D
undertaken as full ￿ internal spillover￿is needed to maximize joint pro￿ts. Thus
all output in the JV is produced at a marginal cost of C. The outsider ￿rm in
the South can gain partial access to the technology developed by the JV. How
great a spillover it enjoys depends on the absorptive capacity and the weakness
of IPR protection in the South, ￿. The pro￿t of the outsider Southern ￿rm is
therefore
￿SO = (p ￿ c)qS2: (13)
where the second subscript O stands for outsider. Solving for the optimal output
by each ￿rm yields
qJ =





15There is a vast literature on JVs and R&D spillovers such as d￿ Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988), Suzumara (1992), Neary and O￿ Sullivan (1999), and Leahy and Neary (2004).
14and
qSO =





for the JV and the outsider Southern ￿rm respectively.




[9 ￿ g(2 ￿ ￿)2]2: (16)
Comparing (9) and (16), it can be seen that the equilibrium R&D is higher




3(2 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
: (17)
This value starts at 5=6 for full protection (￿ = 0) and is falling in ￿ until it
reaches 0 when ￿ = 5=16. 16 Looser IPR protection reduces R&D incentives of
a JV due to higher spillovers, while not a⁄ecting that in the case of FDI. Notice
that the R&D decision is independent of how pro￿ts are divided between the
two partners in a JV as joint pro￿ts are maximized when solving for the optimal
R&D investment.17
16Note that even with full IPR protection, the level of R&D is higher with FDI than a JV
when g ￿ 5=6. This is because the positive strategic e⁄ect of the cost asymmetry on output
is stronger in the FDI case due to a higher number of rivals to compete against. When the
cost di⁄erence is large enough, this e⁄ect outweights the negative scale e⁄ect that FDI entails
due to the smaller size of the MNE.
17We can alternatively solve for the R&D investment that maximizes the Northern share of
pro￿ts in a JV when it chooses to behave on pure self-interest. Our model is robust to such
modi￿cations as the nature of our results remain unchanged.
15Substituting the optimal levels of output and R&D investment back into the








a2[3 ￿ g(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)]2
[9 ￿ g(2 ￿ ￿)2]2 (19)
for the JV and the outsider Southern ￿rm respectively. The pro￿t of the JV is
always decreasing in spillovers, whereas that of the outsider Southern ￿rm is
always increasing with it. The advantage of the JV over a third ￿rm decreases
with a weaker IPR regime as the cost asummerty that exists between the JV
and the outsider ￿rm is reduced.
3 Bargaining in the Joint Venture
Turning now to the bargaining between the two ￿rms in the ￿rst stage of the
game, a deal has to be reached in order to divide the joint pro￿ts in (18) between
the two sides. The portion of pro￿ts that goes to the Northern and the Southern
partner is ￿￿￿
J and (1￿￿)￿￿
J respectively, where ￿ represents the Northern share
in the JV. The size of this share depends on the bargaining power of each ￿rm.
We look at the two extreme cases where either the Northern or the Southern
￿rm holds full bargaining power. When a ￿rm has all the bargaining power, it
captures all rents from the JV and leaves its partner the minimum share that
is just su¢ cient to convince the latter to participate.
16When it is the Southern ￿rm that has all the bargaining power, the MNE￿ s






9 ￿ g(2 ￿ ￿)2
16 ￿ 9g
: (20)
The superscript indicates which side of the deal enjoys the bargaining power.
The share that the Northern ￿rm keeps starts at 9=16 when g = 0 and is
increasing in g until it reaches 1, that is when the Northern ￿rm no longer ￿nds
it optimal to create a JV and share its technology. Meanwhile, the Southern
￿rm would only enter a JV if the share (1 ￿ ￿
S) matches its pro￿ts in the FDI
case, where it uses its old technology to compete with the Northern ￿rm. A JV
not being possible when g is above a critical threshold complies with empirical
￿ndings of Smarzynska Javorcik (2000) and Saggi and Smarzynska Javorcik
(2004), which show that JVs in highly R&D intensive sectors present a lower
potential for transfer of technology as Northern ￿rms would be more likely to
engage in wholly owned projects than to share ownership.
We turn now to the case in which the Northern ￿rm has all the bargaining
power. It o⁄ers a share to the Southern ￿rm that would make the latter indif-
ferent between the JV and FDI. The share that is retained by the Northern ￿rm
is denoted by ￿
N and is the ￿ that solves ￿￿





2 ￿ 8￿ ￿ 1) ￿ g2(24g ￿ 9)(2 ￿ ￿)2
(16 ￿ 9g)2 : (21)
The pro￿ts of the Northern ￿rm when it has full bargaining power in a JV
is ￿
N￿￿




Figure 1: Joint Venture Profit Shares
make the o⁄er if ￿
N￿￿
J ￿ ￿￿
F. The share when the Northern ￿rm has all the
bargaining power is also increasing in g, but is now concave and is higher than
￿
S in the relevant range. Figure 1 illustrates the share of pro￿ts that remains
for the MNE in each case, namely ￿
S and ￿
N, for a situation when IPRs are
fully protected.
4 The Equilibrium Mode of Entry
Based on the outcome of the bargaining process, the Northern ￿rm makes a
decision on how to enter the Southern market. If a JV is to generate additional
pro￿ts for insiders then ￿J ￿ ￿F + ￿Sj. Also, recall that ￿
S = ￿Sj= ￿J and
1 ￿ ￿
N = ￿F= ￿J. Substituting these in the above inequality gives 1 ￿ (1 ￿
￿
N) + ￿




if a JV is to take place. Note that ￿
N is below ￿
S at low g. A JV is not an
equilibrium here because at low g total JV pro￿ts are smaller than the sum of
18pro￿ts of the two participants in the absence of a JV, i.e. ￿J < ￿F + ￿Sj. As
￿J initially rises faster in g than ￿F + ￿Sj, the share o⁄ered by the Northern
￿rm when it has full bargaining also increases faster than its share when the
Southern partner has full bargaining power until ￿
N = ￿
S. At this point, the
maximum share that a ￿rm can get in a JV is also the minimum share that it
will accept, hence there are no rents from forming a JV that could be shared
out among participants. After this threshold level of g, ￿
N > ￿
S and JV brings
extra rents until ￿
S > ￿
N again after a critical level of g (for positive ￿).
Proposition 1 JV is the equilibrium market structure when ￿
N ￿ ￿
S so that
the maximum potential Northern share when a JV is formed exceeds the mini-
mum share it requires to form a JV. This condition assures that extra rents can
be gained from a JV.
Looking back at ￿gure 1, when the Southern ￿rm has the bargaining power,
looser IPR protection in the South leads to ￿
S reaching unity at a lower level of
g because the relative pro￿tability of the JV falls. The MNE instead chooses to
protect itself from exposure to Southern ￿rms by establishing its own subsidiary
abroad. When the Northern ￿rm has the bargaining power on the other hand,
looser IPR protection lowers the share it keeps as JV pro￿ts are lower and a
more generous o⁄er must be made to persuade the Southern ￿rm to enter a JV.
As ￿ increases, the ￿
S curve shifts to the left, while ￿
N slightly shifts down.
Consequently, the ￿rst intersection between the ￿
S and ￿
N curves moves to the
right and a second intersection eventually occurs and moves to the left, thus
reducing the range of g over which a JV occurs. Finally, a level of ￿ is reached
19at which the ￿
N curve lies below the ￿
S curve everywhere, implying that a JV
is no longer viable at any g.
There is a threshold level of ￿ above which a JV is no longer pro￿table
and hence cannot be an equilibrium. A JV will be formed below this threshold
regardless of who holds the bargaining power. This critical level of spillovers




~ ￿ = 2 ￿
s
32 ￿ 9g
g(9g2 ￿ 33g + 32)
: (23)
At ~ ￿ there are just zero gains from a JV. The Southern ￿rm is just indi⁄erent
between staying out of a JV and getting the maximum possible JV share consis-
tent with the Northern ￿rm taking part, (1 ￿ ￿
S). Likewise, the Northern ￿rm
is just as well o⁄ without a JV as forming one and getting the maximum share
￿
N. This implies that the equilibrium form of foreign investment is the same
regardless of which side holds the bargaining power as ~ ￿ is identical for both
cases.18
Lemma 1 The critical level of spillovers ~ ￿ under which a JV is the equilib-
rium market structure is the same regardless of which side of the JV holds the
bargaining power as ￿
N = ￿
S always holds at ~ ￿.
Recall that this threshold determines whether a JV creates additional total
pro￿ts for the insiders than when they remain on their own (￿J ￿ ￿F + ￿Sj).
18It will be seen that the division of the bargaining power does make a di⁄erence in welfare
implications as the share of pro￿ts by the Southern ￿rm and hence producer surplus are





Figure 2: Equilibrium Market Structure
A JV can therefore only take place when the IPR regime in the South is strong
enough so that ￿ ￿ ~ ￿. When a technology is more complex and harder to copy
(low b), the role of IPRs in the decision of the MNE about the mode of entry
diminishes. The equilibrium market structure can be seen in ￿gure 2, which
depicts ~ ￿ for di⁄erent levels of R&D intensity.
The ￿gure illustrates that JVs are only o⁄ered and accepted and hence an
outcome when R&D intensity is in an intermediate range. They are not likely
to occur when R&D e⁄ectiveness is low as the Southern ￿rm has little to gain
from forming a JV to get access to knowledge. Here, we are nearer to the
simple merger case, in which a two-￿rm merger with identical ￿rms will not
be pro￿table. Similarly, it is not in the interest of the Northern ￿rm to share
ownership and its technology when R&D e⁄ectiveness is high, IPR protection
low and the technology easy to copy. Under these circumstances it will dominate
the market on its own. Also the equilibrium JV share of the Southern ￿rm is
tiny in this region causing little change in its market share and hence aggregate
pro￿ts compared to the FDI case. R&D investment and pro￿ts are more convex
21in g under FDI than in the JV scenario. This means that on one hand JVs
are more pro￿table in intermediate levels of g. Therefore, they can also endure
higher spillovers and still be pro￿table in this range (higher ~ ￿). On the other
hand at high g, R&D investment x is increasing at a much faster rate for FDI
than JV with the relative di⁄erence increasing in ￿. This increases the relative
pro￿tability of FDI in high g￿ s causing ~ ￿ to eventually fall in g after reaching
a maximum. We can conclude that a JV only takes place when the level of
IPR protection in the South is su¢ ciently high so that the insiders can exploit
the advantages of merging. The absolute maximum ￿ consistent with a JV is
￿ ￿ = 0:348. When the level of IPR protection is not su¢ ciently stringent, no JV
can occur and the Southern ￿rm remains an independent competitor that uses
the old technology.
Proposition 2 Increasing the IPR protection level in the South (lowering ￿)
reduces the losses due to imitation of the JV technology by the outsider ￿rm and
consequently increases the range of g over which a JV occurs. Lemma 1 reveals
that this is the case regardless of which ￿rm in the JV holds the bargaining
power.
Looking at ￿gures 1 and 2 simultaneously gives interesting new insights
regarding the division of JV shares and the market equilibrium outcome. It is
easy to see that a JV is hence only formed if condition (22) is satis￿ed. Notice
that the intersections of ￿
N and ￿
S in ￿gure 1 for di⁄erent values of ￿ sketches
the ~ ￿ curve in ￿gure 2. As ￿ increases, the range of g for which (22) holds
shrinks until it is never satis￿ed when the ￿
S curve moves completely above ￿
N
22in ￿gure 1 and ￿ surpasses ~ ￿ in ￿gure 2.
5 Southern Welfare
In this section we examine some policies that could be used by the Southern
government to raise welfare. Southern welfare consists of consumer surplus and
the pro￿ts of the two Southern ￿rms. The welfare function can be written as
WF = CSF + ￿S1 + ￿S2 (24)
and
WJ = CSJ + ￿SI + ￿SO; (25)
where the second subscripts I and O stand for insider and outsider, and super-
scripts F and J denote FDI and JV. Initially, we assume that all output is sold




for i = F;J: (26)
Solving for consumer surplus under each mode of entry, we obtain
CSF =










a2[6 ￿ g(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)]2
2[9 ￿ g(2 ￿ ￿)2]2 (28)
for FDI and JV respectively.
23The other constituent of welfare is producer surplus which itself consists
of the pro￿ts of the outsider and the insider Southern ￿rms. The pro￿ts of
the outsider ￿rm not considered for the JV can be seen in equations (11) and
(19) for FDI and JV respectively. The pro￿t of the Southern ￿rm potentially
involved in the JV is given in (11) if the MNE chooses FDI, and is (1 ￿ ￿
S)￿￿
J
or (1 ￿ ￿
N)￿￿
J in a JV depending on which side holds the bargaining power.
Notice that if it is the Northern ￿rm who has the bargaining power, the insider
￿rm￿ s pro￿t can be dropped from the welfare comparison as it is equal to FDI
pro￿ts by the de￿nition of ￿
N.19 When the Southern ￿rm holds the bargaining





2 ￿ 4￿ ￿ 5) + 7]
(16 ￿ 9g)[9 ￿ g(2 ￿ ￿)2]
: (29)
We now turn to the IPR and the foreign investment policies in the South and
discuss how they can be optimally set to maximize Southern welfare.
5.1 The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights
We ￿rst analyze the relationship between the level of IPR protection in the
South and each component of welfare individually. As no spillovers are assumed
under FDI, changing ￿ only a⁄ects welfare when JV is the market outcome.
The impact of ￿ on consumer surplus can be found by looking at changes
in equation (28). ￿ increases consumer surplus until it reaches a peak, after
19Keep in mind that these pro￿ts must however be added to both FDI and JV welfare when
putting three scenarios in the same context.
24which the detrimental e⁄ect of higher spillovers from lower incentives to innovate
dominates and starts to harm consumers in the economy. For high levels of g
where R&D is more intensive, consumer surplus is always falling with a higher
￿. Di⁄erentiating (28) with respect to ￿ gives the optimal level of spillovers
from the consumers￿perspective:









The ￿ that maximizes consumer surplus approaches 1=2 as g tends to zero and
falls in g until it reachs zero at g = 3=4. For higher g￿ s where R&D takes a
meaningful role in the industry, consumers prefer full IPR protection (￿ = 0)
to enjoy higher levels of innovation.
Next we turn to the e⁄ect of ￿ on the pro￿ts of the two Southern ￿rms.
Equation (19) shows that the pro￿ts of the outsider ￿rm is always increasing in
￿ due to the bene￿ts brought about by technological spillovers. Equation (29)
shows that the pro￿ts of the insider ￿rm is always decreasing in ￿ when it has
the bargaining power in the JV and is independent of ￿ when the MNE has the
bargaining power.20 Total Southern pro￿ts therefore also increases in ￿ when
the MNE has the bargaining power. On the other hand, when the Southern
￿rm holds the bargaining power it increases with ￿ at low levels of g, where the
gains of the outsider from spillovers dominates the losses it brings to the insider.
Total pro￿ts are decreasing in ￿ at high g￿ s where the reverse is true.
We can now add up to derive the impact of ￿ on total Southern welfare.
20Recall that the pro￿ts of the insider Southern ￿rm is equal to its pro￿ts under FDI when
the MNE has full bargaining power and is hence independent of ￿.




@￿ > 0 implies that a
higher level of spillovers always increases Southern welfare in the feasible range
of g where JV is a possible outcome. While a higher ￿ always increases total
producer surplus, it also improves consumer surplus up to the point where ~ ￿
and ^ ￿ intersect (g ￿ 1=2) and reduces it thereafter.
The impact of ￿ on welfare when the Southern ￿rm posesses the bargaining
power depends on g, the R&D intensity of the industry. When g is low both
consumer surplus and producer surplus are increasing in ￿, while the opposite
holds at high levels of g. Welfare therefore increases in ￿ for low g, decreases
in ￿ for high g, and is locally U-shaped around the critical value of ￿ g = 1 with
local maxima at ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1. The e⁄ect of spillovers is hence ambiguous




@￿ ? 0). It is however possible to draw from the shape
of WJ(￿
S) that maximum welfare is reached at either the highest spillover rate
in concurrence with a JV, ~ ￿, or at zero spillovers.
When the MNE has full bargaining power so that ￿ always increases welfare,
the optimal policy is the ￿ that gives ~ ￿. To achieve this outcome, IPR protection
needs to be stronger the easier it is to copy the technology of the MNE. When
the Southern ￿rm has the bargaining power, the optimal policy should give ~ ￿
for g ￿ ￿ g, but is ￿ = ￿ = 0 for g > ￿ g. Recall that at high g￿ s total Southern
welfare is at its maximum level with ￿ = 0 as losses from lower incentives to
innovate accompanied by higher spillovers are substantial.
Proposition 3 If a host country prefers a JV as the mode of inward invest-
ment, then subject to the JV constraint (￿ ￿ ~ ￿) the optimal IPR policy should
26give ~ ￿ for g ￿ ￿ g, and for g > ￿ g when the MNE holds the bargaining power.
When production is su¢ ciently R&D intensive (g > ￿ g) and the Southern ￿rm
holds the JV bargaining power, it is in the interest of the South to fully protect
IPRs (￿ = 0).
After assessing how ￿ a⁄ects Southern welfare in the presence of a JV, we
turn to the comparison of welfare under the two market structures (with and
without a JV). The South is able to manipulate the decision of the MNE on
the mode of entry by choosing an IPR regime that assures the preferred form
of inward investment.
Comparing (27) and (28) reveals that consumer surplus with FDI is higher
than that under a JV. This is because the JV results in less competition and
thus a higher price. Comparing the pro￿ts of the outsider ￿rm under the two
modes using (11) and (29), it is easy to see that it is always higher when a JV
is formed. This gain comes from two sources: lower competition and spillovers.
As for the insider ￿rm, we have seen in the previous sections that its JV pro￿ts
only di⁄er from that under FDI when it holds the bargaining power. When IPRs
are fully protected (￿ = 0), the ￿rms prefer a JV except for low levels of R&D
intensity. When IPRs are less well protected on the other hand (￿ > 0), the
relative attractiveness of FDI increases.
Finally, adding up pro￿ts of the two Southern ￿rms for each case reveals





S2. It can therefore be concluded that a JV always favors
Southern ￿rms and hurts consumers as it increases total pro￿ts in the expense
27of lower consumer surplus. Hence if consumer surplus does not enter the welfare
function, then a JV always yields higher Southern welfare. (This would be the
case if all output was produced for export only.)
5.2 Intellectual Property Rights and the FDI Policy
Having calculated all the components of welfare, we can now analyze the opti-
mal mode of inward investment from the point of view of the South and with
it the implications for Southern investment policies that limit foreign share in a
JV. We will now compare Southern welfare under FDI with the best attainable
welfare under a JV. As we saw earlier, the latter reaches a constrained maxi-
mum at ￿ = 0 or ￿ = ~ ￿ depending on the level of g. Recall also that the parity
￿
N = ￿
S holds when spillovers are at the threshold level ~ ￿, making the prof-
its of the insider Southern ￿rm equal under both bargaining power situations.
Furthermore, consumer surplus and pro￿ts of the outsider ￿rm are independent
of the internal division of pro￿ts in a JV. Thus, at ￿ = ~ ￿, total welfare under a
JV is independent of bargaining power.
Lemma 2 Southern welfare under a JV at ~ ￿ is equal regardless of whether the
Northern or the Southern ￿rm holds the bargaining power.
Figure 3 illustrates Southern welfare under FDI and JV for both cases of
￿ = ~ ￿ and ￿ = 0. The ￿gure can be divided into three regions. In the ￿rst
region on the left, which contains the lowest g￿ s where a JV is feasible (g < g0),
the South prefers FDI. Here, spillovers allowed are not large enough to overcome
the bene￿ts of FDI.
28The second region lies within the range g0 ￿ g ￿ g00, where ￿ = ~ ￿ is optimal
and a JV is preferred to FDI regardless of who in the JV holds the bargaining
power (see lemma 2).21 Thus, at ~ ￿, policies aimed at increasing the Southern
share in the JV do not a⁄ect welfare of recipient countries.22
Proposition 4 For a large mid-range of g0 ￿ g ￿ g00, it is optimal for the
South to strengthen its IPR regime to the level that induces a JV (~ ￿). Foreign
investment policies on the other hand prove irrelevant as welfare under ~ ￿ is
independent of the JV shares and thus the bargaining power in the JV (lemma
2).
For g > g00, strengthening IPRs to the level that eliminates spillovers alto-
gether extends the desirability of a JV up to ^ g when the Southern ￿rm holds the
bargaining power. Recall that the interests of ￿rms also moves in this direction
as a JV is the equilibrium outcome for a larger range of g when a more stringent
IPR regime is enforced. Hence, a dual IPR/FDI policy increases the likelihood
that a JV is formed and results in higher welfare when g > ￿ g.23 The small arrow
21Also these results are parallel to Smarzynska Javorcik (2000) and Saggi and Smarzynska
Javorcik (2004) in which the South tends to favor JVs over other forms of FDI believing that
local participation made possible by the former is a better way to facilitate absorption of new
technologies.
22These results are in accordance with those in Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi (2004) regard-
ing the interests of the MNE and the Southern government as long as there IPR protection is
strong enough in this model. Both government and the ￿rm would prefer JV over FDI in an
intermediate range of R&D e⁄ectiveness, in their model, cost of technology transfer.
23Note that welfare is maximized at ￿ = 0 for g > ￿ g when the Southern ￿rm has the
bargaining power.
29on the right hand side of ￿gure 3 shows the welfare gains brought about by a
dual policy, which represents a jump from WJ(~ ￿) to WJ(￿
S;￿ = 0).
Proposition 5 At higher levels of R&D e⁄ectiveness ( ￿ g < g ￿ ^ g), the South
can attain maximum welfare through a dual policy that limits foreign shares in
a JV and fully protects IPRs.
In the third region, where R&D intensity is at its highest level (g > ^ g), the
Southern government prefers FDI as the mode of inward investment because it
brings more competition, the share of the JV o⁄ered to the Southern ￿rm is
negligible, and spillovers are not attractive (discourage innovation). Similar to
the ￿rst region with low g￿ s, interests here are in con￿ ict as the MNE prefers a
JV whereas the Southern government favors FDI.24
Finally, it is never optimal for the South to fully protect IPRs allow a JV,
which yields the entire bargaining power to the incoming MNE. This causes
welfare to drop down to the WJ(￿
N;￿ = 0) curve in all three regions.25
Proposition 6 The South never ￿nds it optimal to fully protect IPRs and con-
cede all bargaining power in a JV to the Northern MNE.
24A JV never occurs and is never preferred for lower values of g not depicted in the ￿gure.
25Notice that these results resemble those in Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi (2004) which
show that under no spillovers, the government in the South always prefers FDI when cost of
technology transfer (R&D e⁄ectiveness in our case) is low. In their model the North has the
full bargaining power as in the case being discussed here.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a North South model in which a Northern
oligopolistic multinational ￿rm that engages in R&D must decide how to serve
a Southern market. We have made the assumption that the market can only
be served locally and the ￿rm must choose whether or not to collaborate with
a local ￿rm. Initially there are two Southern ￿rms already established in the
host country market and the multinational can choose whether or not to enter
a JV with one of them. The basic ingredients that go into the model are fairly
simple, but they nevertheless generate a rich set of results. The principal issue
to which we have applied the model is to e⁄ects of the Southern IPR regime
on a multinational ￿rm￿ s decision between serving a market via an independent
venture type FDI or by setting up a JV with a local ￿rm. We assumed that
entering a JV increases the exposure of the multinational ￿rm￿ s technology to
imitation by rival ￿rms. To capture this e⁄ect we assumed that the local ￿rm
that does not enter the JV (the outsider) could bene￿t from R&D spillovers
31from the JV when IPRs are imperfectly protected.
We demonstrated a precise set of conditions under which the JV will be
established. When ￿rms form a JV and coordinate their production they gain
from reduced competition but tend to help their rivals gain market share. This,
the well-known merger paradox, implies in our context that without R&D in-
vestment the JV is unpro￿table. We showed that the level of R&D intensity
must be su¢ ciently high to overcome the combined loss of market share that oc-
curs as a result of the JV. Lower R&D spillovers also work towards JVs and we
showed that the threshold spillover, below which it is an equilibrium, increases
in the R&D intensity of the Multinational up to a maximum and then declines.
It eventually declines because if the multinational has very e⁄ective R&D it
gains little from sharing its superior technology. Thus we found that JVs are
most likely when R&D intensity is at an intermediate level. The strengthening
of IPRs reduces the losses due to imitation of the JV￿ s technology by the out-
sider ￿rm and consequently increases the range of R&D intensities of production
over which a JV occurs. This creates the possibility that the Southern policy
can alter the way multinationals choose to serve the market. It can do this by
joining up to TRIPS agreement of the WTO.
In addition to looking at the positive aspects of IPR protection we also
employed our model to look at the e⁄ects on welfare in the Southern country
and considered possible policy responses of the Southern government. We found
that when a JV is viable, the sum of southern ￿rms￿pro￿ts under a JV always
exceed the corresponding levels under direct FDI. However this gain to ￿rms
32comes at the expense of the consumer who faces higher prices under the JV.
We found that if the Northern ￿rm has all the bargaining power and IPRs
are fully protected then a JV will be inferior to direct FDI from the point of view
of Southern welfare. For a JV to dominate from a Southern welfare perspective
we need some Southern bargaining power and/or imperfect IPR protection. We
showed that for moderately R&D intensive industries the best possible policy
is to set IPR protection at the level that will just induce a JV to occur. This
result was shown to be independent of the bargaining power of the ￿rms. For
highly R&D intensive industries Southern welfare under a JV can be higher
with full IPR protection, but only if the Southern bargaining power in the JV is
positive. In particular, we demonstrated that this is the case when the Southern
￿rm has all the bargaining power and the level of R&D e⁄ectiveness is above a
threshold level. We also showed that there is also a higher threshold level of the
e⁄ectiveness above which a JV always yields lower Southern welfare than direct
FDI.
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